Political Violence and Law Reform in Turkey: Securing the Human Rights of the Kurds? by Hughes, Edel
The Journal of Conflict Studies
71
Political Violence and Law Reform in Turkey: 
Securing the Human Rights of the Kurds?   
by
Edel Hughes 
ABSTRACT
The article begins with an historical overview of the Kurds in Turkey
and the background to the conflict in the southeast of the country.
The second section examines the manner in which the conflict has
been dealt with by the Turkish authorities and looks in particular at
the effect the imposition of emergency rule and draconian anti-ter-
rorism legislation has had on the enjoyment on human rights. The
article concludes with an analysis of the impact of the reforms
engendered by the European Union accession process.   
INTRODUCTION
The course of the last century has witnessed a proliferation in the number
of localized conflicts throughout the broader European landscape,1 although this
pattern has been slowly reversing over the past number of years.2 These strug-
gles invariably have a nationalist dimension, and are often accompanied by wide-
spread and virulent violence, both by those armed groups generally seeking self-
determination and in the state engagement with and response to the violence. The
purpose of this article is to explore one such conflict, which has been somewhat
neglected in works detailing political violence, ethnic conflict, and ‘terrorism.’
The Turkish example is a compelling one because, unlike the cases of other
countries involved in conflicts in the Middle East, Turkey is a predominantly
Muslim country that has largely embraced liberal Western ideology and is seen
as a strategically important ally of Western states and of the United States in par-
ticular. This fact, coupled with the strong desire of successive Turkish adminis-
trations for the country to become a full member of the European Union, has
undoubtedly influenced the response of the Turkish government to the conflict in
the southeast and potential EU membership is now seen as being the best possi-
ble chance for the large Kurdish minority in Turkey to achieve equality and
respect for their minority grouping. 
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The article will begin by looking at the history of the Kurdish population
in Turkey, detailing the background to the origins of the conflict in the southeast.
This is by no means an attempt to provide a comprehensive history of Kurdish
nationalism in Turkey as this would effectively warrant a comprehensive article
in itself and has indeed been examined in notable works by distinguished com-
mentators.3 What is endeavored, however, is to outline the salient points in the
history of Turkey that have impacted upon the current situation of the Kurdish
minority. The responses to the conflict by the Turkish authorities are sketched
and a critique of how both the ‘war on terror’ and Turkey’s EU membership aspi-
rations have influenced the dynamics of the conflict posited.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY
The use of political violence in southeast Turkey has a long and tortuous
history. The most recent phase began with the formation of the Kurdistan
Worker’s Party (PKK) in the late 1970s and has of late resurfaced following the
end of the PKK ceasefire in mid 2004. This section will look at the historical
background of the Kurds in Turkey from the beginning of the last century, which
goes some way toward explaining the present-day conflict.
Turkish Kurds in the Early Twentieth Century
Unstable Peace: From the Treaty of Sèvres4 to the Treaty of Lausanne5
Whilst the origin of the Kurdish people is uncertain, it is generally held that
they have retained their distinctive identity for at least 2,000 years.6 The most
modern phase in the history of the Kurds of Turkey can perhaps be said to have
begun in 1918 with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.7 At the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919 there was general agreement that Turkey’s minorities should
be “assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportu-
nity of autonomous development,”8 albeit that the Kurds were “ill-prepared to
face the challenge of the post-war settlement and the new nationalism.”9
Despite tribal loyalties, a number of the Kurdish intelligentsia attempted to
establish political groups that would advocate Kurdish independence or autono-
my.10 Of these, Kurdistan Taali Djemiyeti (Society for the Recovery of
Kurdistan) is seen as having been the most important as its leadership and sup-
port were drawn from eminent Kurdish immigrants in Istanbul.11 Their society
was not to remain united for long as it soon became split between the autono-
mists, who wanted to stand by the Turks, and the ‘independentists,’ who felt that
they should be striving for complete self-determination. Aware that any inde-
pendent state promised to the Armenians by the Allies would come at the expense
of the Kurds, a group led by General Sharif Pasha, a former Ottoman diplomat,
cooperated with Armenians and presented a joint memorandum to the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919.12 With the close of the Peace Conference and ensu-
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ing Treaty of Sèvres, the Kurds were brought “closer to statehood than ever
before or since.”13
Those parts of the Treaty of Sèvres pertaining to Kurdish statehood stated
that a commission of Allied appointees would draft “. . . a scheme of local auton-
omy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of
the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north
of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia.”14 Article 64 of the treaty
seemingly rubber-stamped the idea of an independent Kurdish state:
If within one year of the coming into force of the present Treaty the
Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address
themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a man-
ner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires
independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that
these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends
that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute
such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over
these areas.
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject
of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and
Turkey.  If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will
be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to
such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part
of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet.  
However, the guarantees provided by the treaty remained strictly illusory
in nature, as a lack of political will ensured that the provisions of the treaty relat-
ing to the Kurds remained unenforced. In fact, “Britain was the only one of the
powers with more than a passing interest in seeing Kurdistan on the map.”15 In
any case, events in Turkey quickly overcame what little impetus was provided by
the treaty. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s revolt in Anatolia was supported by a sig-
nificant number of Kurds, indicating their “identity with the other Muslims of
Anatolia and their fears of falling within an Armenian, and therefore Christian,
state.”16 During Atatürk’s struggle to establish a Turkish nation state he became
a “virtual dictator by popular consensus”17 and with his defeat of the Greeks in
1922 and the elimination of practically all of the remaining Christians in
Anatolia, the Allies were forced to renegotiate the settlement of 1920.18
A new peace conference was arranged for November 1922, culminating in
the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. When the agreement was signed, Turkey,
under Atatürk’s direction, had achieved all of its demands, apart from the terri-
torial claim over Mosul.19 The treaty, unlike its predecessor at Sèvres, contained
no provisions relating to Kurdish autonomy or the possibility of a Kurdish State
and contained no reference to Kurds whatsoever. With regard to the dispute
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between Britain and Turkey over Mosul, the question was referred by Great
Britain to the Council of the League of Nations for settlement. The Kurds sought
to demonstrate their anger at the loss of Kurdistan and the move to incorporate
Mosul into either Iraq or Turkey “by way of an independence movement led by
Sheikh Mahmud, which ultimately was suppressed by aerial bombardment of the
British Royal Air Force.”20 The only allusion to the rights of Kurds came in the
decision of the Commission of Enquiry established under the auspices of the
Council of the League of Nations to inquire into whether or not Mosul should be
part of Iraq or Turkey. The commission, siding with Great Britain in deeming that
the vilayet should become part of Iraq, attached two conditions, one of which
stated that “[r]egard must be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that offi-
cials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country,
the dispensation of justice and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should
be the official language of all these services.”21 The Council of the League, fol-
lowing the request for an advisory opinion from the Permanent Court of
International Justice,22 adopted the proposals set out in the report of the
Commission of Enquiry in December 1925, inviting the British Government to
“lay before the Council administrative measures which will be taken with a view
to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the
Commission of Enquiry the guarantees regarding local administration recom-
mended by the Commission in its final conclusions.”23
It took Turkey less than a year to accept the decision of the Council of the
League of Nations and settle the issue of borders. The Angora Treaty between
Great Britain, Iraq, and Turkey established cross-border control of Kurdish activ-
ity by stipulating that Asian states would refrain from corresponding in an offi-
cial or political manner with chiefs, sheikhs, or other tribal members who were
nationals of the other state and in the territory of the other state and not permit in
the frontier zone any organization for propaganda or meeting directed against
either state.24
‘Turkification’ and Kurdish Rebellion
Atatürk, having previously stressed the unity of Turks and Kurds and even
the idea that the Kurdish region would regain some sort of special status
appeared to have changed his mind by mid-January 1923, stating: 
Those in our national borders are only a Kurdish majority in limited
places.  Over time, by losing their population concentration, they
have settled with Turkish elements in such a way that if we try to
draw a border on behalf of the Kurds we have to finish with
Turkishness and Turkey, for example in the regions of Erzerum,
Erzinjan, Sivas and Kharput, — and do not forget the Kurdish tribes
on the Konya desert.  This is why instead of considering Kurdishness
in isolation, some local autonomies will be established in accordance
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with our constitution. Therefore, whichever provinces are predomi-
nantly Kurd will administer themselves autonomously.  But, apart
from that, we have to describe the people of Turkey together.  If we
do not describe them thus, we can expect problems particular to
themselves . . . it cannot be correct to try to draw another border
[between Kurds and Turks].  We must make a new programme.25
Thus, while there is no evidence of a willingness to grant any sort of polit-
ical power to the Kurds in this statement, there is still a certain amount of recog-
nition of their identity.  David McDowall notes, however, that a major shift took
place during the following four weeks: “When Kemal’s speech to the Izmir
Economic Congress (17 February 1923) was published, all reference to the
Kurds had been excised.”26 Amongst the reasons for this change in policy was
the fact that the social and political traditions of Kurdistan presented an obstacle
to Atatürk’s idea of a modern state built on the European model. Additionally, the
disruptions in Kurdistan in 1922 and the estrangement of some Kurdish chiefs,
as well as the fear that the resolution of the territorial battle over Mosul, in which
the Kurds of southern Kurdistan gained a certain degree of autonomy, were a
threat to the country’s borders.27
The program of ‘Turkification’ initiated by Atatürk was aggressively
pursued from 1923 onwards. In the elections for the new Grand National
Assembly in the summer of 1923, it was felt in the Kurdish areas that the new
candidates fielded and returned had “been nominated by the government rather
than elected by the people,”28 thereby exiling Kurdish dissent. Gradually, senior
administrative appointments in Kurdistan were all filled by Turks and any refer-
ences to Kurdistan were deleted from official documents, and Kurdish place
names were replaced by Turkish ones. By 1924, the use of Kurdish in an official
capacity was banned, effectively depriving people in Kurdish areas of education.
The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924,
cut the last ideological tie Kurds felt with Turks.  The closure of the
religious schools, the madrasas and kuttabs, removed the last
remaining source of education for most Kurds.  By stripping Turkey
of its religious institutions, Mustafa Kemal now made enemies of the
very Kurds who had helped Turkey survive the years of the trial,
1919-22.  These were the religiously-minded, the shaykhs and the
old Hamidiya aghas who had genuinely believed in the defence of
the caliphate.29
In addition to the effect that the abolition of the Caliphate had on the Kurds,
‘turkification’ and secularization of the education system meant that Turkish was
the only language taught and necessitated the abolition of any foundation or
institution espousing a separate Kurdish identity.  Kurdish associations, schools,
religious groupings, and publications were prohibited.  
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These radical changes to the fabric of Kurdish society, coupled with “the
threat to Kurdish identity, and the threat to the traditional order of aghas and
sheikhs (through the destruction of the Sultanate and Caliphate), unified many
Kurds of different viewpoints.”30 For the first time a Kurdish movement includ-
ed not only the politically astute members of the Kurdish intellectual elite, but
also aghas and sheikhs, who in turn mobilized large numbers of the Kurdish pop-
ulation. It is estimated that from 1924-38 no less than 17 Kurdish uprisings took
place,31 the most significant of which, the Sheikh Said rebellion, occurred in
1925.32
In the aftermath of the failed rebellion in 1925 the area of the southeast was
subjected to an “extensive pacification programme,”33 during which between
40,000 and 250,000 peasants died and hundreds of villages were destroyed.34
This program of ‘pacification’ continued until the end of 1927 and included mass
deportations with the intention of stripping the area of its Kurdish population.
Martial law was declared in the southeast in February 1925. 
Kurds in the Post-Atatürk Turkey
An End to Rebellion?
Following the successive defeats of Kurdish uprisings in the late 1920s and
1930s, a period of relative calm ensued for nearly 30 years. The measures taken
by the Turkish authorities during the rebellions — massacres, deportations, and
militarization — understandably had a marginalizing effect on the Kurdish pop-
ulation, compelling them into a submissive silence.35 The extent of the forced
deportations is evidenced in McDowall’s estimate that more than one million
Kurds, including aghas and sheihks, had been forcibly displaced between 1925
and 1938.36 At the end of the Second World War both Turks and Kurds voted
overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party; the rule of the Republican People’s
Party finally came to an end in 1950 in the first free general election. The elec-
tion of the Democratic Party, which had been founded by Adnan Menderes and
Celal Bayar, the latter a prime minister and finance spokesman under Atatürk,
coupled with the creation of new parliamentary parties, “were undoubtedly a
considerable move forwards for Turkey as a whole and even for Kurdistan,
which was the Party’s main stronghold.”37 Votes from the Kurds were rewarded
with a relaxation in the police and military repression in the southeast. Exiled
sheihks, landlords, and aghas were allowed to return home, and recover their
goods and lands in return for their parliamentary support. Many were even elect-
ed to parliament and some became ministers, while infrastructure, schools, and
social facilities were improved in the region.38 The new Kurdish elite “espoused
a new philosophy called doouculuk (‘Eastism’) which advocated economic
development in the neglected east.”39 The first group of ‘Eastists,’ Kendal notes,
were based in Diyarbakyr and published a daily newspaper in Turkish, in which
they criticized the underdevelopment and lack of infrastructure in the east of the
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country. In 1959, however, the paper’s publishers and those classed as ‘Kurdists,’
about 50 leaders of the movement, were arrested and imprisoned.40 The eco-
nomic instability, in addition to the deep resentment within the army regarding
its loss of power over the political life of the country, was to come to a head in
1960.
The Military Coup of 1960 and Repercussions
On 27 May 1960, Turkey underwent a military coup d’état at the hands of
a disgruntled army who felt that the old revolutionary ideas of Kemalism had
been abandoned, resulting in the country being governed for a year and a half by
a “Committee of the National Front made up of the main participants of the
coup.”41 Following elections in 1961 the committee allowed a civilian govern-
ment to take over once more.  The introduction of a new constitution followed
the elections and, according to McDowall, had the effect of improving the situa-
tion of the Kurdish community, although not before thousands had been deport-
ed by the military.42 “This constitution allowed freedom of expression, of the
press and of association.  Kurds were able to express their dissent through
Turkish structures, organizations, publications and so forth, writing in Turkish
and even in Kurdish concerning the history, folklore and economic problems of
the ‘East,’ even though the authors risked imprisonment for their views.”43
Conditions further improved for the Kurds with the formation of a new cabinet
in 1962, which saw the Ministry of Health responsibilities go to Dr. Azizoolu,
leader of the New Turkey Party and a Kurd from Diyarbakyr.44 Although he was
eventually accused of “regionalism” and Kurdish nationalism, and was forced to
tender his resignation, this was not before he had “more hospitals and dispen-
saries built in Kurdistan than all previous governments put together.”45 By 1963,
the right to strike and form collective agreements had been recognized as being
protected under the new constitution, although a ban on forming any regionalist
associations that might divide the nation was maintained.  
Kendal refers to ‘Eastism’ as “a transitory period in the rebirth of the
Kurdish national movement.”46 This “rebirth” was also influenced in no small
part by the events taking place in Iraqi Kurdistan. The armed Kurdish uprising,
led by Mustafa Barzani, which had begun in November 1960, undoubtedly had
a huge effect on the subsequent radicalization of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey,
an outcome which the military had feared from the outset of the uprising in Iraq.
General Gürsel, leader of the junta, is quoted as issuing the following warning to
the Kurds of Turkey who may be tempted to imitate their neighboring rebels in
1960: “If the mountain Turks do not keep quiet, the army will not hesitate to
bomb their towns and villages into the ground.  There will be such a bloodbath
that they and their country will be washed away.”47 In 1965, a covert party called
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PKDT) was established in solidarity with
Barzani’s nationalist movement. McDowall notes that its supporters tended to be
traditionalists, much like Barzani’s supporters in Iraq, whereas, unlike the
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Turkish Workers’ Party,48 who were leftists, the PKDT were “explicitly sepa-
ratist.”49
Throughout the 1960s both Kurdish and leftist parties became increasing-
ly vocal and amassed large numbers of supporters. In response, the government
intensified its campaign to eliminate subversive activity. This led to many of the
Kurdish-Turkish journals that had begun publication in the mid-1960s being
banned in 1967 and their editors arrested.50 As the repression of the Demirel gov-
ernment increased from 1967 onwards, “with the use of special commando
groups to patrol Kurdistan and intimidate the population and ransack the homes
of suspects, Kurdish students and militants (apparently close to the Turkish
Workers’ Party) called for mass demonstrations, which took place on 3 August
1967 — the first expression of Kurdish anger for 30 years.”51 These demonstra-
tions were encouraged by the publication in April 1967, of an anonymous article
in the Turkish magazine, Ötüken, stating that the Kurds were a backward people
devoid of history and culture, who wanted to carve Turkey into pieces.52
The demonstrations, which attracted up to 25,000 people in some cities,
were violently suppressed by the Turkish authorities. In response to the oppres-
sion an Organisation of Revolutionary Kurdish Youth (DDKO) established the
Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Centres in 1969, with the aim of promoting civil
liberties and raising awareness of the social deprivation in the east of the coun-
try. With an increase in leftist groups in Kurdistan, confrontations with rightist
groups, who were often backed by the police, also increased as did the number
of political murders.53 The popular Turkish Workers’ Party became the first legal
party to recognize the plight of the Kurds at its Fourth Congress in October 1970,
when it tabled a motion on the Kurdish question.  This resolution led to the party
being banned.54
Formation of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
By the end of the 1960s it was illegal to use the Kurdish language and a
1967 decree declared it “illegal and forbidden to introduce to, or distribute in, the
country, materials in the Kurdish language of foreign origin in any form pub-
lished, recorded, taped or material in similar form,” thereby prohibiting the pro-
motion of the language in any guise whatsoever.55 In March 1971, the govern-
ment was again overthrown by the military. Thousands were arrested, with wide-
spread reports of murder and torture, particularly in the east, where there had
been claims of an impending Kurdish uprising. Oppression of the Kurdish pop-
ulation was to continue “erratically” throughout the 1970s.56
The most significant event in the history of modern Kurdish nationalism
occurred in 1974 with the formation of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK).
At this time Abdullah Ocalan was working in the Ankara Higher Education
Union and it was through his work there that he was provided “with the founda-
tions of an ideological, political and strategic outlook.”57 In 1974, he met with
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other militant Kurdish nationalists to draw up a plan for the formation of a “dis-
tinct Kurdish leftist organization, which would have no ties with Turkish leftist
groups, all of which had ignored the Kurds’ specific needs.”58 What they had in
mind was a liberation movement, known initially as Ulusal Kurtuluº Ordusu
(National Liberation Army) with Ocalan elected as its leader. Initially the group
was an ideological one; a revolutionary youth group was established with the aim
of attracting Kurdish youths and intellectuals. During the period between 1978
and 1980 the party organised itself and refined its politics, to allow the group to
become a “political force.”59 The organisation would, in time, evolve into a polit-
ical party — the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which was officially formed
on 27 November 1978 declaring itself the “new organization of the proletariat of
Kurdistan.”60
The formation of the PKK came just before what Kerim Yildiz has termed
“[t]he most devastating period of recent history for the Turkish Kurds.”61
Following yet another military coup d’état in 1980, martial rule was imposed in
southeast Turkey. The limited concessions granted the Kurds under the 1961 con-
stitution were annulled with the new 1982 constitution. The leader of the junta,
General Evren, enforced the ban on Kurdish even more strictly than before,
ordered the raiding of villages and homes in the southeast, and had tens of thou-
sands of Kurds arrested. The situation was deemed so grave that, at this time,
almost two-thirds of the Turkish army was deployed in the southeast.62 By 1984,
the PKK had declared a war of national liberation against the Turkish state.
RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT
Until recently the response of the Turkish authorities to the conflict in the
southeast of the country was a purely military one, with widespread allegations
of human rights abuses perpetrated by both sides to the conflict.63 The military
have always favored a military solution to the Kurdish problem and the political
will to bring about a settlement or even countenance an approach other than a
military one has been largely absent.64 The gravity of the current conflict can be
gleaned from the estimate that 37,000 people lost their lives in the period
between 1984 and 1999, the majority of whom were Kurds.  In addition, by 1999,
approximately 3,500 villages in the southeast had been evacuated and about three
million civilians (mainly Kurds) displaced.65 This section will analyse the con-
sequences that the suppression of PKK violence has had on the enjoyment of
human rights for the Kurdish population in the southeast. In particular the con-
sequences of the imposition of a civil state of emergency in the region and the
enactment of anti-terrorist legislation will be explored.
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Reaction of the Turkish State to PKK Political Violence
The Village Guard System
In the years following the escalation of violence in 1984, Turkish troops
deployed in the southeast responded in a severe manner, resorting to draconian
measures in an attempt to crush revolt against the state. PKK guerrilla attacks
were met with mass arrests, beatings, and torture, responses that became com-
monplace in the course of the conflict.66 By 1985 alone, the state had demanded
the death penalty in the trials of more than 600 cases.67
The government attempted to mitigate PKK attacks on supporters of the
government by arming villagers so that they could protect themselves. In April
1985, an amendment was made to the Village Law, which allowed for the main-
tenance of temporary village guards.68 Those who volunteered for the guards
were generally identified with right or far right political parties, attracted by “an
income several-fold above the average per capita income in the area,”69 and per-
haps by the opportunity to mete out their revenge on the PKK. It was widely
reported that the Village Guards were responsible for committing serious human
rights violations during the conflict. Some were allegedly involved in the forced
evacuation of villagers, drug trafficking, rape, corruption, and theft, but have
been rarely been investigated or brought to justice.70 The number of Village
Guards recruited was as high as 65,000. Their existence was yet another menace
to Kurds as those who were unwilling to join faced retribution from the state in
the form of expulsion from their homes and the possible razing of their village.71
Imposition of a Civil State of Emergency
In 1983, the Turkish government enacted the State of Emergency Law,72
which provided the legal parameters for the imposition of a civil state of emer-
gency in July 1987. Article 3(1)(b) of the law provided that the Council of
Ministers assembled under the chairmanship of the president would declare a
state of emergency “whenever there appear serious indications resulting from
widespread acts of violence which are aimed at destroying the free democratic
order or fundamental rights or freedoms, or violent acts causing serious deterio-
ration to public order, after consultation with the National Security Council, in
one or more regions or throughout the country for a period not exceeding six
months.” The law sanctioned the imposition of a number of wide-ranging pow-
ers and restrictions in the case of an emergency. The Council of Ministers were
granted the authority to issue “decrees having the force of law” on any matter
“necessitated by the state of emergency” without adhering to the normal legisla-
tive procedure set out in the constitution,73 whereas Article 11 allowed for the
restriction of a plethora of fundamental rights. This article granted the power to
impose curfews; prohibit any kind of assembly; prohibit or limit the distribution
of any kind of publication or broadcasting; search persons and their property and,
if necessary, seize goods of evidentiary value; make the carrying of identity cards
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mandatory; as well as numerous other prohibitions deemed necessary for state
security. 
The state of emergency, which related to 10 of the predominantly Kurdish
provinces in the southeast, was formally declared in the Turkish parliament on
19 July 1987.74 Thereafter, rights and freedoms enshrined in the Turkish consti-
tution became regulated by the State of Emergency Law. The duty of imple-
menting the state of emergency legislation (OHAL) was vested in the office of
the governor of the province or regional governor(s) by virtue of Article 14(1) of
the law. These offices were granted substantial powers, with no provision for
independent judicial review of their actions, a situation which “substantially con-
tributed to the breakdown of the rule of law under OHAL.”75 An example of the
type of powers exercisable by the regional governor is Article 4 of Decree No.
285 (10 July 1987), which empowered the office to order the temporary or per-
manent evacuation of villages. Article 4 also provided that all private and public
security forces, and the gendarmerie public peace command were placed at the
disposal of the regional governor and that these security forces were subject to
the law on the Procedure for Investigation of Civil Servants, under which they
could not be prosecuted for acts committed in their administrative capacity with-
out the permission of the administrative authorities. The administrative councils
not only took up the investigation of criminal offences by members of the admin-
istration but were also empowered to decide whether or not to bring a prosecu-
tion, subject to automatic judicial review before the Supreme Administrative
Court in cases where they decided not to prosecute. This function of the admin-
istrative councils has been the subject of much criticism.76
A further illustration of the unchecked power vested in the regional gover-
nor was Decree No. 430, enacted in 1990 to amend Decree No. 285. The amend-
ed decree conferred power on the regional governor to prevent any type of indus-
trial dispute, to order general searches of private and public property, and to pro-
hibit, confiscate, and close publishers disseminating materials likely to cause
serious disruption to public order.  Article 7 provided that the exercise of the
powers conferred under the State of Emergency Law could not be retracted or
annulled by any court. Under Article 8 a right of action lay for damages caused
by unlawful administrative action but it excluded liability of the local governors
or the regional governor for damage caused by acts or decisions connected with
the exercise of emergency powers vested in them, effectively making the emer-
gency civil administration, including the security forces, unaccountable for their
actions.77
Anti-Terrorism Legislation  
On 12 April 1991, Act No. 3713 introduced the Law to Fight Terrorism,78
which established a sweeping array of draconian powers in an effort to curb the
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political violence in the southeast. For the purposes of this law, terrorism was
given the broad definition of
any kind of act conducted by one or more persons belonging to an
organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the
Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social,
secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the
State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the
Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the
authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms,
or damaging the internal or external security of the State, public
order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, ter-
ror, intimidation, oppression or threat.79
In addition to providing the authorities with this wide-ranging definition of ter-
rorism, the law introduced substantial restrictions on individual freedoms, of
expression, liberty, and association in particular, and also stipulated that offences
within the scope of the law would be tried in State Security Courts. These spe-
cial courts were established to adjudicate on political and serious criminal cases
deemed to threaten the integrity of the state or national security.  The courts were
governed by special procedures that afford fewer protections to defendants than
procedures for ordinary Turkish courts and are comprised of a military judge on
each panel.80 The functioning and impartiality of State Security Courts has, since
their inception, been criticized and in 1998 the European Court of Human Rights
ruled that their composition violated the convention guarantee of an independent
and impartial tribunal under Article 6(1) of the convention.81
Subsequent to the enactment of the Law to Fight Terrorism, its effect on
basic liberties became apparent. Just a year after the law came into force, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, acting upon the results of
inquiries carried out by its Political Affairs Committee and Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, adopted a resolution on the human rights situation in
Turkey, in which it stated that “very serious human rights violations, including
torture and disappearances, continue to occur in Turkey.”82 The resolution added
“. . . the Assembly is deeply concerned about the escalation of violence in this
region.  It strongly condemns terrorist attacks, perpetrated mainly by the PKK
(Kurdish Workers Party), as well as certain actions by the security forces and
recalls that in a democratic state, any reply to terrorist provocation must remain
within the rule of law.”83 Among the recommendations adopted in the resolution
were that Turkey amend its Anti-Terror Law84 and lift the state of emergency.85
The Nature of the Rights Affected Under Emergency Rule
Following the imposition of emergency rule in southeast Turkey in 1987,
it was subsequently extended on more than 40 occasions, until its eventual lift-
ing in November 2002. Whilst Turkey’s compliance with international obliga-
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tions has improved, particularly due to efforts to join the European Union, nev-
ertheless, serious human rights violations have been perpetrated by and on behalf
of the state during the conflict in the southeast. This section examines the cate-
gories of rights that were most greatly affected by the legislation and the impact
that their abrogation has had on the civilian population.86
Freedom of Expression
Historically restrictions on freedom of expression have been endemic in
Turkey.  Although some advances were made in the 1961 constitution, limita-
tions on the use of the Kurdish language and other forms of expression have been
employed. According to Yildiz, the restrictions on non-violent expression in
Turkey are “fundamentally linked to both her strict adherence to the notion of the
homogenous and secular Turkish identity, and her elevation of the idea of the
state.”87 In 1983, Law 2932 prescribed imprisonment for those who conveyed
any idea in a language that was not an official language of other nations.  The
simple use of the term ‘Kurdish’ was banned, as were expressions of Kurdish
culture, such as song or dance or giving children Kurdish names.88 In the years
following the return to parliamentary rule in 1984, some progressive measures
were introduced; left-wing groups that did not advocate violence were no longer
perceived as such a profound threat and there were fewer prosecutions of their
members.89 Furthermore, in April 1991, Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the penal
code, provisions which had criminalized advocacy of communism, Kurdish sep-
aratism, or religion-based government respectively, were repealed. This was fol-
lowed by the revocation of Law 2932, although education or broadcasting in the
medium of Kurdish remained illegal. A report by Amnesty International in 1996
contrasted the relative freedom to openly criticize and challenge the government
engendered by these reforms with the “severe restrictions to freedom of expres-
sion which continue to be imposed on those issues which the state considers vital
to its integrity: maintaining the dignity of the army and the security forces, the
institution of military service and, above all, defeating Kurdish separatism.”90
Article 8 of the Law to Fight Terrorism introduced in 1991 criminalized the
dissemination of separatist propaganda, with special penalties applicable to the
publisher, editor, and author of such material. It stated that “[w]ritten and oral
propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the
indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are forbid-
den, regardless of the methods, intentions and ideas behind such activities. Those
conducting such activities shall be punished with a sentence of between 2 and 5
years’ imprisonment and with a fine of between 50 million and 100 million
Turkish liras.”91 Such a draconian measure had a profound effect on the ability
to publish material in Kurdish as all such material was now considered “sepa-
ratist propaganda.”  Although initially there were few prosecutions under Article
8, the number of detentions and prosecutions under the provision grew dramati-
cally in 1993-94, all of which were justified on the grounds of state security.
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Article 8 was widely criticized by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but
it also provoked much condemnation amongst leading politicians and even mem-
bers of the government.92 Although amendments were made to Article 8 in
October 1995, separatist propaganda remained an offence punishable by impris-
onment. It would take almost 10 years for real reform to permeate the freedom
of expression restrictions with the implementation of the Sixth Harmonization
Package in 2003.93
Freedom of Association  
From the inception of the 1982 constitution the right to form associations,
particularly political ones, was limited.94 Article 11(b) of the State of Emergency
Law passed in 1983 authorized the prohibition of “any kind of assembly” as a
measure that could justifiably be taken in the case of violence whereas in the def-
inition of terrorism in the 1991 law, an organization was defined as including for-
mations and associations, be they armed or unarmed.95 Restrictions on freedom
of association have always formed part of the Turkish bulwark against Kurdish
nationalism. The military government’s Law on Trade Unions, the Law on
Political Parties, and the Law on Associations were unambiguous with regard to
promoting the idea of Kurdish nationalism or challenges to the ‘indivisible’
nature of the state. Kendal notes the unequivocal conditions set out in Article 89
of the Law on Political Parties: “No political party may concern itself with the
defense, development, or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture; nor
may they seek to create minorities within our frontiers or to destroy our nation-
al unity.”96 Numerous political parties have been banned during the conflict97 as
Kurdish or pro-Kurdish parties have been viewed as tantamount to supporters of
political violence. In March 1994, four DEP (Democracy Party) leaders were
charged with supporting the PKK when they spoke in Kurdish and wore Kurdish
colors during their inauguration in parliament. Intimidation and arbitrary raids on
the offices of political parties sympathetic to the situation of the Kurds in the
southeast have become commonplace during the conflict. In addition to the
harassment endured by Kurdish political parties, Article 81(c) of the Law on
Political Parties prohibits the use of Kurdish in electioneering.98
Law 2911 on Assembly and Demonstrations set out restrictions on the right
to peaceable demonstration. Under this legislation, demonstrations must be
authorized by the local governor who has an arbitrary power to refuse authoriza-
tion. The penalty for holding an unapproved demonstration under this law was
imprisonment of up to three years. Arrests, intimidation, and beatings by the
police have frequently accompanied demonstrations.99 As well as restrictions
placed on political parties, suppression of the right to freedom of assembly has
also come under the guise of restrictions on trade union membership and activi-
ty.100 Despite some reforms in the area of trade union rights, as recently as 2002
complaints from public sector workers have been made, detailing severe burdens
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being placed in the way of union membership by employers, including threats of
dismissal and compulsory transfer.101
Torture
The conflict in the southeast has produced numerous allegations of torture
perpetrated by the Turkish forces on detainees. These claims have been substan-
tiated both at regional and international levels by inter-governmental and non-
governmental organizations, leading one NGO to state in 1996 that it was “a mat-
ter of record that torture is widespread and systematic in Turkey.”102 The issue of
torture is one that has been raised in many Turkish cases that have come before
the European Court of Human Rights and in many of them the court has found
Turkish authorities guilty of that practice.103 In 1992, following a number of ad
hoc visits to Turkey, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture stat-
ed in light of information at its disposal that it could “only conclude that the prac-
tice of torture and other forms of severe ill-treatment of persons in police custody
remains widespread in Turkey and that such methods are applied to both ordinary
criminal suspects and persons held under anti-terrorism provisions.”104
Although it is clear that torture was systematically used by the police and
gendarmes on those suspected of being political offenders, it has also been sug-
gested that it was used to punish those suspected of being PKK sympathizers and
even to intimidate detainees into becoming police informants.105 Although the
culture of impunity surrounding allegations of torture made against agents of the
state might have dissipated somewhat over the past number of years, there is
nothing to suggest that the practice has been eliminated. The 2002 World Report
of Human Rights Watch included the claims of many lawyers and human rights
defenders in Turkey that torture and ill-treatment had actually increased, while in
the European Commission’s 2005 progress report on Turkey it was noted that
further efforts were required to strengthen safeguards against torture.106
Fair Trial Rights
International law dictates that a number of procedural guarantees must be
adhered to when a suspect is arrested and brought to trial. It has often been the
case, however, that in situations where the crime is political violence these min-
imum requirements are dispensed with in the effort to apprehend perpetrators.
Turkey is no different in this regard and has in fact been largely reluctant to apply
the standards set by international law and by Article 5 and 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights in particular, in dealing with alleged political
offenders arising from the conflict in the southeast.
Article 11 of the Law to Fight Terrorism allowed for the incommunicado
detention of suspects for up to 15 days. This period could be doubled in areas
under a state of emergency by virtue of the extension of custody provision in
Article 26 of the State of Emergency Law. It has been claimed that this inordi-
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nately long detention period was designed to allow wounds inflicted by torture
to heal as detainees reported having being interrogated in the first days of their
detention.107 Both the European Court of Human Rights and international human
rights protection agencies have pointed to the clear lack of safeguards in place
for the ill-treatment of detainees that prolonged detention invariably brings.
Those detained on suspicion of political offences previously have had no guar-
antees with respect to access to lawyers or medical attention, despite Turkey’s
obligations to provide such minimum legal protections.  There have also been
many allegations that intimidation of defence lawyers and refusal of access to
defendant’s files is commonplace.108 In addition to the violations of procedural
rights at the pre-trial stage, the prosecutions of offences pertaining to political
violence have been held in State Security Courts, whose lack of independence
and impartiality was confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights.109
Destruction of Villages and Forced Evacuation
Although there is no official acceptance that there was a systematic plan
for the displacement of Kurds in the southeast, this policy, which began with the
Law on Resettlement of 1934, was pursued throughout the duration of the cur-
rent conflict. As the PKK has drawn its main membership and support from the
peasant population of the villages, displacing villagers was seen as a method of
combating the revolt. Reports detailing the evacuations describe them as violent
and unlawful; villages were surrounded by security forces, troops, and village
guards who burned equipment, livestock, and houses, often not allowing vil-
lagers to retrieve their possessions.110 The violence and destruction used in the
evacuation of villages means that now, even with the implementation of the
Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project, some of them cannot be re-inhabit-
ed. The numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Turkey is difficult to
gauge as no independent statistics have been recorded.  In 1995, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that the number was in the
region of two million whilst a fact-finding mission from the Helsinki
Commission concluded that the number of displaced villagers exceeded three
million in 1996.111 The 2005 report of the European Commission noted that the
situation of Turkey’s IDPs “remains critical, with many living in precarious con-
ditions.”112
Forced evacuation has caused innumerable problems for those affected,
among them a deterioration of physical and psychological health. Research con-
ducted with migrants suggests that the majority experience difficulties in access-
ing basic services, such as clean drinking water, electricity, and heating.113 The
United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons place respon-
sibility with the national authorities to provide protection and humanitarian assis-
tance to those displaced. Due to the failure of the Turkish state to protect such
persons and implement an effective program for return, human rights agencies
have assessed that the situation remains worrying and the Return to Village and
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Rehabilitation Project has been described as “little more than an empty shell”;
village guards, it is pointed out “still bear arms, kill their neighbours, and block
returns in safety and in dignity. A substantial number of villagers have returned,
but mainly on the strength of their own meagre resources, and only for the sum-
mer months because the government has not provided the infrastructure for them
to settle permanently.”114
A cursory examination of the nature of human rights affected under the
emergency rule in the southeast demonstrates that abuses have been perpetrated
across a broad spectrum of rights. The following section examines what recourse
those affected have had under international law and the improvements, if any,
brought about by the lifting of the state of emergency and reforms instituted in
the process of European Union accession.  
Conflict in Turkey and International Law
The European Convention on Human Rights
Although Turkey has a ratified a number of international human rights
treaties,115 the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights
has had by far the greatest effect in terms of individual access to justice and, to
a certain extent, on the dynamics of the conflict. Throughout the last two
decades, the European human rights protection system has provided a vehicle
through which victims of abuses in Turkey have been able to obtain some form
of redress. The cases that have come before the court have highlighted the sys-
tematic nature of the violations and prompted the parliamentary assembly of the
Council of Europe to send fact-finding missions to the region on a number of
occasions.116
The European Court of Human Rights has found that Turkey violated the
convention guarantee of the right to life under Article 2 in numerous cases, many
of which have concerned extra-judicial killings. While the court has stopped
short of holding that there was a practice among the Turkish authorities of vio-
lating Article 2 of the Convention,117 it has found a violation of the article in a
phenomenally large number of cases. The issue of state responsibility for
‘unknown perpetrator’ killings118 has been a recurring theme in the cases that
have come before the court as many applicants have alleged that killings have
been carried out either by the security forces or with their full knowledge, and
whilst the court has shied away from finding direct state involvement in unlaw-
ful killings, it has found that responsibility can be engaged where death is an
unintentional result of deliberate state force.119 Violations of Article 2 have also
been found in a plethora of cases due to the lack of an independent investigation
in situations of alleged state killings. The scale of this problem is evidenced by
the fact that in 2005 alone the court found that this procedural element of Article
2 had been violated in 28 cases. With regard to the issue of disappearances, a
problem that has been prevalent in southeast Turkey during the conflict, the court
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was unwilling to find a violation of Article 2 in Kurt v Turkey,120 where there was
found to be insufficient evidence to prove that the applicant’s son met his death
in custody. In Cakici v Turkey,121 however, “sufficient circumstantial evidence
based on concrete elements”122 in the case of the applicant’s brother, who had
been missing for four years and was officially regarded as being dead, was ade-
quate to attribute his death to the state. 
The volume of cases concerning Turkey’s alleged violations of Article 3 of
the convention has also been significant. Although Turkey now reputedly adopts
a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to torture, this has not always been the case. One of
the most prominent cases regarding torture to come before the court was that of
Aksoy v Turkey,123 where the court found that the treatment, including
‘Palestinian hanging,’ which the applicant had been subjected to, was deliberate-
ly administered for the purpose of extracting an admission or information and
amounted to torture. In other Article 3 cases concerning Turkey, the court has
held that rape by a state official amounts to torture124 and that certain forms of
treatment in custody that may not amount to torture, constitute inhuman and
degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3.125
Given the extraordinary restrictions on freedom of expression in Turkish
law before the reform process it is little wonder that the court has found viola-
tions of Article 10 of the convention in more than 40 cases. Despite recent
changes to legislation and adverse judgments from the court, freedom of expres-
sion remains severely limited in Turkey.  The European Commission noted in
2004 that even the revised law “continues to be used to prosecute those who crit-
icize the state institutions in a way that is not in line with the approach of the
ECtHR.”126 Turkish freedom of expression guarantees remain so dubious that it
has even been suggested that where previously charges would have been brought
under Article 8 of the Law to Fight Terrorism, they are now simply brought under
the Penal Code, Article 169 which punishes the aiding of an illegal organization
and Article 312, which refers to inciting racial, ethnic, or religious enmity.127 A
pertinent example of the type of case concerning a violation of Article 10 is that
of Han v Turkey128 decided in September 2005.  The applicant, a member of the
People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), was charged with disseminating separatist
propaganda under Article 8 of the Law to Fight Terrorism for a speech he had
made, in which he referred to the ‘Kurdish nation’ and ‘Kurdistan,’ and was sen-
tenced to one year’s imprisonment and a fine. The court, in finding for the appli-
cant, concluded that the applicant’s conviction was disproportionate to the aim of
preventing terrorism and therefore could not be perceived as being necessary in
a democratic society.129 
Amendments to various laws have eased some of the restrictions placed on
freedom of association in Turkey over the past number of years. Even with the
implementation of the new reforms, the law nonetheless remains particularly
strict in relation to political parties.  Pro-Kurdish parties are still equated with
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support for the PKK, which led to the Constitutional Court ordering the perma-
nent closure of the pro-Kurdish HADEP party in March 2003, convicted of
charges of supporting the PKK and committing separatist acts under Article 169
of the Penal Code.130
The European Court has found Turkey to be in violation of Article 11 in a
number of cases. The 1998 case of United Communist Party of Turkey v
Turkey131 involved a party that had been dissolved immediately after being
formed, and its founders and managers banned from holding similar office in any
other political body. The European Court made the important determination in
this case that there is nothing in the wording of Article 11 to prevent it applying
to political parties132 and held that its dissolution “ordered before its activities
had even started and coupled with a ban barring its leaders from discharging any
other political responsibility, is disproportionate to the aim pursued and conse-
quently unnecessary in a democratic society. It follows that the measure
infringed Article 11 of the Convention.”133 More recently, in November 2003,
the court found in Socialist Party (STP) & Others v Turkey134 that the
Constitutional Court had acted in violation of Article 11 in ordering the dissolu-
tion of the Socialist Party on the grounds that its program was liable to under-
mine the territorial integrity of the state. The court decisions concerning Turkey
have had the effect of bringing the harassment of pro-Kurdish political parties to
light. In its 2004 report, however, the European Commission noted that there was
“no new developments” with regard to the execution of five judgments of the
European Court concerning the dissolution of political parties.135
The majority of cases concerning Turkey that the court has examined have
related in some way to the conflict in the southeast and indeed many of them con-
cern human rights abuses perpetrated against Kurds. The impact of adverse deci-
sions by the court have had the effect of raising the profile of the conflict and
bringing the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Turkish authorities to the
attention of the broader European community. They have also provided a yard-
stick by which the European authorities can assess whether or not Turkey is
implementing the necessary reforms warranted by the decisions of the court and
necessitated by its bid to become a member of the European Union.136 The fol-
lowing section will look at the nature and implementation of the reforms engen-
dered by this process. 
European Union Accession, Harmonization, and Reform
The prospect of obtaining full European Union (EU) membership has pro-
vided the impetus for the implementation of a series of reforms aimed at harmo-
nizing Turkish legislative practice with that of other EU countries. This process
is one that began with tentative steps from 2001 onwards but was accelerated
with the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in a landslide vic-
tory at the November 2002 general elections.  Whilst developments to ensure
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greater enforcement of human rights are undoubtedly welcome, non-govern-
mental organizations and commentators have sounded a cautionary note against
relaxing scrutiny of Turkey’s implementation of the reform packages.137 On 17
December 2004, the EU ultimately decided to open formal accession negotia-
tions with Turkey but this was not before member states had assured themselves
that a number of advancements had been achieved and in particular that the con-
ditions set out in the Copenhagen Criteria had been  fulfilled.138 Included in the
criteria for membership was the requirement that the candidate country have
achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.” Whether the reforms
implemented in an effort to comply with this criterion are genuine or merely seek
to present a sanitized picture for the benefit of those deciding on accession will
undoubtedly be judged on the impact that they are seen to have among ordinary
civilians.
Lifting the State of Emergency
The state of emergency was not lifted in its entirety until 30 November
2002, despite the fact that the PKK called a unilateral ceasefire in 1999 follow-
ing the capture of its long-time leader, Abdullah Ocalan. According to one fact-
finding commission that visited the region in 2002, when emergency rule had
ended in most provinces, its lifting was “an act of enormous symbolic signifi-
cance to the people of the region.”139
In June 2003, almost a year after the lifting of the state of emergency, a fur-
ther fact-finding mission found that serious violations of human rights continued
to occur in the southeast. The report highlighted a number of problems; among
the more serious concerns were the continued military oppression in the south-
east, restrictions on freedom of expression and association, and an institutional
opposition to reform.140 The mission noted that the number of arbitrary deten-
tions, torture, and ill-treatment appeared to have risen since the end of 2002.141
Although the military presence had diminished somewhat — there were fewer
military checkpoints in operation — those that remained were strategically
placed so that they restricted the everyday movement of people.142 In addition,
the village guards remained armed and active despite being officially disbanded
with the lifting of the state of emergency, “operating in a legal vacuum, outside
any higher authority and with total impunity.”143 The nature of human right vio-
lations in the southeast continued to the extent that between January and July
2003, the Turkish Human Rights Association recorded 14 extrajudicial killings
and 17 deaths in prisons.144
Implementation of the Harmonization Packages
It is indisputable that there have been comprehensive improvements in the
legislative protection of human rights in Turkey since the beginning of the acces-
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sion process. The legislative amendments have largely been facilitated by the
implementation of the so-called “harmonisation packages,” which have made
positive reforms to a wide range of legislation. To date, there have been two
major constitutional reforms, in 2001 and 2004, and eight legislative packages
adopted by parliament between February 2002 and July 2004. New codes have
also been adopted, including a Civil Code and Penal Code. 
A significant development was the repeal of Article 8 of the Law to Fight
Terrorism, which had severely limited freedom of expression.145 The pervasive-
ly wide definition of ‘terrorism’ was also redefined as: 
the criminal act committed by a person or persons as members of an
organisation by using force and violence by method of oppressing,
scaring, deterring, suppressing or threatening, in order to change the
features of the Republic as prescribed in the Constitution, the politi-
cal, legal, social, secular, economic order, to dismantle the individ-
ual unity of the state with its territory and nation, to endanger the
existence of the Turkish State and the Republic, to weaken or destroy
or take over the State authority, to destroy fundamental rights and
freedoms, to harm the internal and external security of the State, the
public order or the public health. 
The second part of the article provides that where “two or more persons come
together with an aim to commit the terrorist crime prescribed in the first para-
graph, an organisation prescribed in this Law will be deemed to have been
formed.”146 The newly framed definition, although still not narrowly construed,
is more in line with European practice than the previous classification.147
In principle the legislative reforms implemented in Turkey confirm its
robust commitment to protecting fundamental rights. The right to freedom of
expression was enhanced not only by the repeal of the Law to Fight Terrorism
but also by the promulgation of the Press Law,148 which regulates the printing
and publication of printed matter, in June 2004. Article 3 attests to the freedom
of the press, which includes “the right to acquire and disseminate information,
and to criticise, interpret and create works.” Article 12 of the Law stipulates that
the owner or editor of a periodical “cannot be forced to either disclose their news
sources or to legally testify on this issue.” The traditional antipathy of the state
toward broadcasts and education in the Kurdish language has also been relaxed
through the implementation of the reforms. The adoption of the Sixth
Harmonisation Package in June 2003149 relaxed restrictions on broadcasting in
the Kurdish language — an amendment to Article 4 of the Act on the
Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and Television Stations sanctioned the
broadcasting, on both private and public radio, and television stations, in lan-
guages and dialects used by Turkish citizens traditionally in their daily lives. In
the area of education, the Regulation on Teaching Different Languages,150 for
example, which came into effect in December 2003, regulates the teaching of dif-
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ferent languages and dialects that the Turkish citizens use traditionally in their
daily lives. Further reduction of the restrictions placed on freedom of expression
was achieved with the adoption of the Seventh Harmonisation Package.151
Nevertheless, although the process engendered by potential accession to
the EU was intended to bring freedom of expression guarantees into line with
those of EU member states, this has not entirely been the case.  The new Penal
Code, which came into force on 1 June 2005, replaced Article 159 with a new
Article 301, making it a crime to denigrate ‘Turkishness,’ the Turkish Republic,
or the foundations or institutions of the state.  It states: 
(1) A person who explicitly insults being a Turk, the Republic or
Turkish Grand National Assembly, shall be imposed a penalty
of imprisonment for a term of six months to three years. 
(2) A person who explicitly insults the Government of the
Republic of Turkey, the judicial bodies of the State, the mili-
tary or security organisation shall be imposed a penalty of
imprisonment for a term of six months to two years. 
(3) Where insulting being a Turk is committed by a Turkish citi-
zen in a foreign country, the penalty to be imposed shall be
increased by one third. 
(4) Expression of opinions with the purpose of criticism does not
require penalties.
Recent cases that have come to international attention concern prosecutions
taken under Article 301.  Orhan Pamuk was charged under the article for remarks
made during an interview in February 2005 in which he referred to the 1915 mas-
sacres of Armenians and the killing of Kurds in southeast Turkey.152 His prose-
cution for insulting ‘Turkishness’ came as a sharp reminder that Turkey has some
way to go in terms of providing for freedom of expression and prompted calls for
Article 301 to be repealed.153 Although the charges against Pamuk were subse-
quently dropped in January 2006,154 other trials under Article 301 are ongoing.
Another recent case concerning Article 301 is that taken against Hrant Dink, edi-
tor of the bilingual Armenian Turkish newspaper, Agos, who was convicted of
insulting Turkey’s national identity and given a six month suspended sentence
for publishing a series of articles in which he called on diaspora Armenians to
stop focusing on the Turks and focus instead on the welfare of Armenia.155 Since
the prosecution of Pamuk in 2005 as many as 80 others have been prosecuted
under Article 301156 leading to consternation in the European Parliament, which
has called for the abolition or amendment of the provisions of the penal code
“which threaten European free speech norms.”157
Greater protection for rights relating to associations and freedom of assem-
bly guarantees have also been facilitated by the implementation of the Seventh
Harmonisation Package.  The new Associations Law158 stipulates that legal per-
The Journal of Conflict Studies
93
sons are entitled to establish associations without need to obtain prior permission
(Article 3) whereas the provision in Article 312 of the old penal code restricting
those convicted of criminal offences from establishing associations has been
abolished (Article 4). With regard to peaceful assembly, Article 3 of the law on
Demonstrations and Public Meetings159 now stipulates that citizens have the
right to hold peaceful meetings and marches without prior permission. By virtue
of Article 17 of the law, demonstrations can only be banned where there is a
“clear and imminent threat of a criminal offence being committed.”
Nevertheless there have been numerous reports of banned assemblies and police
brutality during peaceful demonstrations.160
In 2001, the Council of the European Union indicated that Turkey must
“[s]trengthen legal provisions and undertake all necessary measures to reinforce
the fight against torture practices, and ensure compliance with the European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture” as a priority in its accession partner-
ship with Turkey.161 Since this decision, a number of reforms have been imple-
mented and a purported ‘zero tolerance’ policy on torture adopted.162 According
to the provisions of Supplementary Article 7 to the Code of Criminal Procedure,
set out in the Seventh Harmonisation Package, the investigation and prosecution
of cases of alleged torture are to be treated as urgent and hearings of these cases
may not be adjourned for more than 30 days, unless there are exceptional cir-
cumstances. In addition to this safeguard, Articles 94-96 of the revised penal
code provided heavier penalties than previously for those found guilty of inflict-
ing torture.  
The vigor of the reforms on torture are such that it has been noted that
Turkey’s formal protections are now among the strongest in Europe.163
Nonetheless, despite the very evident commitments Turkey has made to elimi-
nating torture on paper, there are numerous testimonies to indicate that this mes-
sage has not filtered through to agents of the state. In the European
Commission’s 2004 report on Turkey’s accession, it was noted that “[a]lthough
torture is no longer systematic, numerous cases of ill-treatment including torture
still continue to occur and further efforts will be required to eradicate such prac-
tice.”164 It was reported in 2005 that cases of beatings, electric shocks, detainees
being stripping naked, and death threats in police and gendarme custody contin-
ued to be a concern165 and national non-governmental organisations in fact claim
that the practice of torture remains systematic in Turkey.166 Yildiz concludes that
“torture levels are unacceptably high and the Turkish government has manifest-
ly failed so far in its responsibility to eradicate the practice.”167
Improvements in the reduction of instances of torture come largely as a
result of the implementation of new procedural safeguards for detainees. In
January 2003, Law No. 4778 enacted a series of reforms strengthening the right
of access to a lawyer in cases under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts.
In April of that year, a Human Rights Violations Investigation and Assessment
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Centre was established within the Gendarmerie Command and the sixth reform
package repealed provisions preventing lawyers from being present during state-
ment taking when they are defending those being tried under the competence of
State Security Courts. Changes in the rules of procedure with regard to State
Security Courts168 have also been enacted to eliminate incommunicado deten-
tion.  Despite these reforms, it has been reported that there is still a lack of effec-
tive mechanisms to monitor the implementation of detention regulations and
investigate patterns of abuse by the security forces.169
An interesting development with regard to the situation in the southeast has
been the enactment of the Law on Compensation for Damage Arising from
Terror and Combating Terror,170 the purpose of which was to “define the princi-
ples and procedures pertaining to the paying of compensation to persons suffer-
ing losses caused by terrorist actions or activities carried out in the struggle
against terrorism” (Article 1). Article 4 of the law provides for the establishment
of commissions to assess claims upon receipt of applications, which has particu-
lar resonance for internally displaced persons as it offers the possibility for com-
pensation for material losses suffered during the program of displacement insti-
gated to counter PKK violence. The operation of the law has not been without
criticism, however, a lack of independence of the assessment commissions; a
failure to provide legal aid for the applicants; and a delay in processing claims
have been outlined in one critical report, which concludes that the objective of
the law “is not actually to compensate for damages suffered, but to appease the
EU within Turkey’s accession negotiations.”171
CONCLUSION: IMPACT OF THE REFORM PROCESS AND
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
It is without question that Turkey has successfully instituted a large num-
ber of legislative and administrative reforms in a very short period of time. The
country is now a state party to all of the major international human rights instru-
ments, the death penalty has been abolished,172 and it would appear that there is
progress being made in many areas, hastened undoubtedly by the bid for
European Union accession.  
Whether or not the reforms are actually being put into practice though can
only be assessed from independent reports emanating from the region and
assessments of international agencies. With that in mind it is clear that there is
still much to be achieved in the way of implementation. In 2004, the European
Commission noted that whilst significant progress took place on the ground,
implementation of the reforms remained “uneven.”173 In support of this claim it
highlighted problems such as the continued influence exercised by the military
through a series of informal mechanisms; the draft new Code of Criminal
Procedure, the draft Laws on the Establishment of the Judicial Police, and on the
Execution of Punishments had not been adopted; corruption remained a serious
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problem in almost all areas of public affairs; cases of ill-treatment, including tor-
ture, continued to occur; the new penal code provided only limited progress with
regard to freedom of expression and cases of prosecution for non-violent expres-
sion continued to arise; and there were continued restrictions on broadcasting
and education in minority languages.174 The report pragmatically concludes that
“[t]he changes to the Turkish political and legal system over the past years are
part of a longer process and it will take time before the spirit of the reforms is
fully reflected in the attitudes of executive and judicial bodies, at all levels and
throughout the country. A steady determination will be required in order to tack-
le outstanding challenges and overcome bureaucratic hurdles.”175
The decision of the European Council in December 2004 to open accession
talks with Turkey would appear to evidence their confidence that the improve-
ment in human rights protections committed to in a series of legislative and
administrative reforms will continue to be implemented in a practical manner.
Given the fact that the 2004 report on Turkey’s accession is quite critical of the
lack of implementation of the reforms, the decision just two months after the
issuing of the report by the commission was hailed by some commentators as
being premature.176 One year after the decision to open accession negotiations,
the Commission’s 2005 report noted that further efforts were required in the
areas of freedom of expression, women’s rights, religious freedoms, trade union
rights, cultural rights, and the strengthening of the fight against torture and ill
treatment.177 In the Commission’s most recent report on Turkey’s progress
toward accession, a number of areas of concern are highlighted.  The commis-
sion noted a deterioration in the situation in the southeast and “widespread
reports of excessive and arbitrary use of force by the security forces”178 and
expressed serious concerns about freedom of expression.179
It is manifestly clear that the prospect of EU membership has had the great-
est influence on human rights standards in Turkey. The prospect of accession has
had more of an impact than derisory European Court of Human Rights decisions,
international condemnation, and non-governmental lobbying combined.  It is
thus imperative that the monitoring of the European bodies continues, to ensure
that human rights standards in Turkey are eventually brought into line with inter-
national practice and respect for the Kurdish minority ensured.  It is, after all,
only through the realization of human rights protections for all citizens in the
southeast that political offenders may eventually be persuaded that armed con-
flict is not the only way to advocate reform.
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